Legal Responses to Genocide and Other Massive Violations of Human Rights by Reisman, W. Michael
REISMAN.FMT 04/03/98 10:43 AM
LEGAL RESPONSES TO GENOCIDE AND
OTHER MASSIVE VIOLATIONS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
W.  MICHAEL REISMAN
*
What can the enlightened sectors of the international community do to pre-
vent and halt the proliferation of genocides and massive human rights viola-
tions around the planet?  We evade the obvious, albeit costliest answer—to ar-
rest them before, or at least while they are happening, by any means necessary:
to stop them by stopping them.  Instead, we focus on actions after the fact.  One
method, which is particularly favored is to create courts to try the perpetrators
of atrocities.  Indeed, in the course and the wake of the atrocities committed in
Cambodia, southern Sudan, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda, Burundi,
Zaire—the list grows relentlessly—many in the international community call
for the creation of ad hoc or standing international criminal courts to deal with
the gravest of international legal delicts.
Courts are indispensable institutions in many domestic criminal and civil
systems, and any polity, no matter how structured, must construct mechanisms
of varying degrees of institutionalization to apply the law to concrete cases.
But lest we fall victim to a judicial romanticism in which we imagine that
merely by creating entities we call “courts” we have prevented or solved major
problems, we should review the fundamental goals that institutions designed to
protect our public order seek to fulfill.
National legal systems allocate different responsibilities to criminal and civil
law, but common to all legal systems is a set of fundamental sanctioning goals
for the protection, restoration, and improvement of public order.  While these
fundamental goals have been expressed in many forms, they may be synthe-
sized into seven specific goals:1
(1) Preventing imminent discrete public order violations;
(2) Suspending current public order violations;
(3) Deterring, in general, potential future public order viola-
tions;
(4) Restoring public order after it has been violated;
(5) Correcting the behavior that generates public order viola-
tions;
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(6) Rehabilitating victims who have suffered the brunt of public
order violations; and
(7) Reconstructing in a larger social sense to remove conditions
that appear likely to generate public order violations.
Preventing is an anticipatory public order function.  It anticipates the immi-
nent rupture of public order, seeks to intervene before the rupture eventuates,
and with the aims to obviate it.  Once a rupture has occurred, suspending seeks
to arrest the injuries by focusing on the agent of the violation.  It involves an
immediate response to the breach of public order, terminating the breach and
containing the destructive effects of the act.  While preventing and suspending
are specific to particular violations of public order, deterring is more general.
Deterring involves the use of various conjectural devices to craft current re-
sponses that encourage putative violators in the future to refrain from commit-
ting violations.  Deterrence may be accomplished by credible threats of conse-
quences for violations and/or indulgences and rewards for compliance.
Correcting involves identifying and adjusting individual or group patterns of
behavior that have generated or may generate ruptures of public order.  Reha-
bilitating focuses on the victims and may involve compensation in various forms
designed to redress injuries.  Social reconstructing involves identifying social
situations that generate or provide fertile ground for violations of public order,
and introducing resources and institutions that can obviate such situations.
These seven goals are cumulative in the sense that an efficient public order
system performs all of them, though the achievement of some goals, such as
prevention and deterrence, will reduce the importance of some of the others.
The common denominator of all of these goals, however, should be to protect,
reestablish, or create a public order characterized by low expectations of vio-
lence and a heightened respect for human rights.  When the institutions as-
signed to fulfill these goals are effective, disruptions of the public order will be
minimized and the destructive consequences of those that do occur will be con-
tained.  For those who would design institutions for the protection of public or-
der, the challenge is not to imitate or transpose but rather to shape institutions
that, in their idiosyncratic context, will fulfill the protective goals of public or-
der.
A wide range of international institutions and practices is currently used in
different combinations for accomplishing the goals just discussed.  Although a
variety of international practices can be used in the proper context to protect
public order, eight institutional practices and arrangements are particularly im-
portant:
(1)  human rights law, the law of state responsibility, and the de-
veloping law of liability without fault;
(2)  international criminal tribunals;
(3)  universalization of the jurisdiction of national courts for cer-
tain delicts, called “international crimes”;
(4)  nonrecognition or the general refusal to recognize and to
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allow violators the beneficial consequences of actions deemed
unlawful;
(5)  incentives in the form of foreign aid or other rewards;
(6)  commissions of inquiry or truth commissions;
(7)  compensation commissions; and
(8)  amnesties.
These practices and institutional arrangements are not interchangeable.
Each deals with a different aspect of the problem and may not be appropriate
for all circumstances.  Additionally, each practice or institution need not be
consistent with all the sanctioning goals in every case.  Some may provide high
returns for certain goals in particular cases, but may also prove very costly for
alternative goals in other cases.  For example, major cash payments or other
concessions may prevent an imminent violation or secure the release of hos-
tages, but they will have high costs for deterrence in the future, as other actors
may calculate that they too can extort concessions from the community by
threatening to violate public order.  On the one hand, international criminal
tribunals may serve to deter violations in future cases, but may increase the
costs of suspending ongoing violations if violators conclude that continued re-
sistance is preferable to facing a judgment by the tribunal.  On the other hand,
amnesties may facilitate suspension of ongoing violations, but amnesties also
undermine deterrence, the law of state responsibility, and human rights.  Pro-
spective violators may conclude that if they do not prevail, they can negotiate
an amnesty.
Criminal tribunals involve the identification of perpetrators of violations of
the law, confirmation of the norms that apply, and the imposition of penalties.
Depending on the nature and goals of incarceration, criminal tribunals may be
corrective.  Although many in the international community often demand
criminal tribunals when there are serious breaches of public order, tribunals
only indirectly perform sanctioning goals.  Tribunals in the international con-
text also encounter a “fit” problem.  In liberal societies, the criminal law model
presupposes some moral choice or moral freedom on the part of the putative
criminal.  In many of the most hideous international crimes, many of the indi-
viduals who are directly responsible operate within a cultural universe that in-
verts our morality and elevates their actions to the highest form of group, tribe,
or national defense.  After years or generations of acculturation to these views,
the perpetrators may not have had the moral choice that is central to our no-
tion of criminal responsibility.  At the very end of his long book, Professor
Goldhagen writes, in an endnote:
By all accounts, during the Nazi period the youth of Germany were thoroughly racist
and antisemitic, were living, essentially, in a world structured by important cultural
cognitive assumptions as fantastically different from our own as those that have gov-
erned distant times and places.  One former Hitler Youth, Alfons Heck, The Burden
of Hitler’s Legacy (1988), describes the widespread antisemitism, “shared by millions
of Germans,” which was imparted to them in school during their weekly “racial sci-
ence” classes.  He and the other children “absorbed their teacher’s demented views as
matter-of-factly as if he were teaching arithmetic … .“ Heck, drawing on his own ex-
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perience, rightly indicts his countrymen: “All children are defenseless receptacles,
waiting to be filled with wisdom or venom by their parents and educators.  We who
were born into Nazism never had a chance unless our parents were brave enough to
resist the tide and transmit their opposition to their children.  There were few of
those. …”  For accounts of the racist antisemitic ideas with which German students
were inundated, see The Nazi Primer: Official Handbook for Schooling the Hitler
Youth (1938), which was the textbook for the seven million fourteen to eighteen-year-
olds in the Hitler Youth.  It presents the Jews in an explicit eliminationist [manner]
….2
In the cascade of atrocities in Africa, a comparable type of acculturation
may have occurred.  There, the use of child soldiers is wise-spread and well-
documented.  For example, a force that styles itself “the Lord’s Resistance
Army,” an outgrowth of a Christian fundamentalist revolt, is leaving a wake of
atrocities in northern Uganda, most of them committed by teenagers.  Sisto
Okello, who was abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army, but escaped, said,
“It’s most young teen-age children. … The children do these atrocities because
they are ordered to do so.  If they are told to be ruthless, they are absolutely
ruthless, and they can kill.”3  Is the criminal law model an effective measure in
circumstances—lamentably wide-spread—such as these?
Punishment is often a theoretical possibility which is only rarely applied to
these cases.  If it is applied, it may have a deterrent effect and/or may suspend
violations by depriving certain individuals of their liberty.  In contrast, the focus
of compensation tribunals or commissions shifts from the perpetrator of the
crime to the victim of the crime, for whom some compensation is established
and paid according to standards for the actors involved.  Human rights law, the
law of state responsibility, and the more recent “liability without fault” regime,4
provide substantive and procedural standards for state and nonstate actors
as well as guidance for compensation tribunals.  For instance, commissions of
inquiry, now often referred to as “truth commissions,” involve, with varying
degrees of system and rigor, authoritative investigation and publication of vio-
lations of international norms.  These institutions seek to perform a wide range
of sanctioning goals.
Amnesties have been singled out recently as a technique for reestablishing
internal public order after its violent disruption within a nation-state.5  Their
compatibility with sanctioning goals will depend on their design and other con-
textual features.  Amnesties are especially useful tools for prison administrators
and political negotiators.  For the administrator of a prison, the authority to
grant amnesty on a discretionary basis is a technique of internal control; many
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prisoners will behave well if they think there is a high probability that they will
be rewarded with a shortened sentence or complete amnesty.  For the political
negotiator, whether in a domestic or transnational conflict, the capacity to offer
amnesty is also an indispensable tool.  If the elite and substantial parts of the
rank-and-file of one side anticipate that a consequence of a peace agreement
will be their prosecution for acts undertaken in the course of the conflict, they
hardly will be disposed to lay down their arms.  The strict application of law in
these circumstances may result in continued intense conflict, with the consump-
tion of the social values that the law entails, ended only by the elimination or
the unconditional surrender of one side.  Furthermore, because a political elite
often will be highly dependent on the morale and commitment of its rank-and-
file, the prospect of a negotiated settlement that secures amnesties for the lead-
ership but not for those in the ranks well may prevent that leadership from
concluding an agreement.
Amnesties also may be important as a technique for stitching together the
wounds in civil society that precipitate and often result from conflicts.  Article
6(5) of Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 provides that
“[a]t the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavor to grant the
broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed con-
flict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict,
whether they are interned or detained.”6
However, there are significant protective public order costs to amnesties.
The jurist may have the luxury of time to foresee long-term strategy, while the
political negotiator usually faces sharp time demands, requiring quick tactical
decisions.  Thus the jurist is more likely to appreciate that the most urgent ob-
jective in the application of law is not to punish those who may have violated it,
but to stop ongoing atrocities and, insofar as possible, to sustain the expecta-
tions of law’s effectiveness in the minds of all other potential violators.  What is
done cannot be undone.  What is not yet done may yet be prevented.  Acts of
kindness or grace to current violators, or, as is sometimes the case, convenient
deals, may have very high, long-term costs: Potential violators may assume that,
threats of strict application of law notwithstanding, when the time comes for
settlement, they, too, can strike a bargain in which they will be forgiven.
The lesson to be learned from this review, I submit, is that the varied cir-
cumstances of the international community are such that, rather than a single
institution, a toolbox of different institutions should be on hand.  There is no
general institution that can be applied as a paradigm for all circumstances.  In
each context, an institution appropriate to the protection and re-establishment
of public order in the unique circumstances that prevail must be fashioned such
that it provides the greatest return on all the relevant goals of public order.
Thus, these tools may be adapted and used in particular circumstances to fulfill,
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in the most optimal fashion possible, the fundamental goals of international
law:  the protection and reestablishment of public order.  In circumstances in
which the international community is prepared to defeat an adversary, an in-
ternational tribunal, applying an approximation of the domestic criminal law
model, is an effective strategy.  The tribunal model is much more satisfying in a
moral and legal sense because it provides vivid confirmation of international
authority.  Total victory creates, at least momentarily, the monopoly of power
that is the pre-condition of an effective criminal justice system in the municipal
setting.  In circumstances in which the international community is unwilling to
make such an investment, and such reluctance seems to be more often than not
the order of the day, it may be preferable to emphasize techniques that rees-
tablish public order as quickly as possible and fulfill, to the extent actually pos-
sible, feasible sanctioning goals of public order.
